Abstract-In this paper, we present some practical experience on implementing an alert fusion mechanism from our project. After investigation on most of the existing alert fusion systems, we found the current body of work alternatively weighed down in the mire of insecure design or rarely deployed because of their complexity. As confirmed by our experimental analysis, unsuitable mechanisms could easily be submerged by an abundance of useless alerts. Even with the use of methods that achieve a high fusion rate and low false positives, attack is also possible. To find the solution, we carried out analysis on a series of alerts generated by well-known datasets as well as realistic alerts from the Australian Honey-Pot. One important finding is that one alert has more than an 85% chance of being fused in the following 5 alerts. Of particular importance is our design of a novel lightweight Cache-based Alert Fusion Scheme, called CAFS. CAFS has the capacity to not only reduce the quantity of useless alerts generated by IDS (Intrusion Detection System), but also enhance the accuracy of alerts, therefore greatly reducing the cost of fusion processing. We also present reasonable and practical specifications for the target-oriented fusion policy that provides a quality guarantee on alert fusion, and as a result seamlessly satisfies the process of successive correlation. Our experimental results showed that the CAFS easily attained the desired level of survivable, inescapable alert fusion design. Furthermore, as a lightweight scheme, CAFS can easily be deployed and excel in a large amount of alert fusions, which go towards improving the usability of system resources. To the best of our knowledge, our work is a novel exploration in addressing these problems from a survivable, inescapable and deployable point of view.
INTRODUCTION
The emergence of alert fusion techniques has significantly changed the troublesome job of analysing rough alerts, which originally belonged to network security administrators. However, most alert fusion systems themselves are not survivable because, for example, a job that comes across the alerts as overwhelming can barely survive from the tens of thousands of meaningful or meaningless alerts because the system does not have the efficiency to deal with it. We analysed this problem laterally by using two facts: (1) in some networks, the firewall is set to drop 'ping' packets and an inside IDS monitors its existence. We bypass the firewall and bomb the inside IDS with 'ping'. In our experiment with one Snort deployed, the alert emission speed reached more than 100 pieces per second. (2) Some "IDS stress tools" like Stick [1] and Snot [2] , produce IP packets capable of triggering rules from a spoofed IP range into a target IP range. Stick is reported to be able to produce alerts at around 250 pieces per second. If this happens on a large-scale, the fusion phase could easily be overwhelmed by the emitted alerts without appropriate methods.
Alert fusion approaches are generally deployed in a large-scale network environment. There exists a trade-off between scalability and complexity. We believe the reason for this is basically the low efficiency of alert fusion processing. As long as efficiency is supported, the conflict between scalability and complexity will be relieved.
As summarized by Viinikka in [3] , most approaches of alert processing aim to eliminate false alerts and/or adjust the alert priority using additional information. Like most aspects of network security, it is a case of attackers developing new methods and defenders developing new countermeasures against these attacks. Once these countermeasures become accepted practice, the attackers develop countercountermeasures, ad infinitum. The sticking point is the existence of a threshold. Most mechanisms implicitly have a presupposition (except for some statistical methods applied in algorithms like [3] and absolute fusion and correlation like [4] ). Drawing lessons from game theory [5] , attackers are not thought to be stupid because they will not launch attacks using pre-arranged routes.
A serious approach to the problems above, involves satisfying the survivable, inescapable properties as well as being easily deployed within the aimed system. In the alert fusion field, this task may intuitively develop in fusion efficiency. As far as we know, there are few papers that deal with this as a whole. In this paper, we make this our concern.
We firstly analysed the alerts from traditional and classical security datasets (Darpa datasets [6] , Defcon 8 & 10 [7] , Treasure Hunt [8] ). One interesting pattern we found was that an alert had more than an 85% chance of being fused in its successive 5 alerts. The probability reached more than 90% in 10 successive alerts. This interesting phenomenon indicates that most of the alerts are consecutive in time as well as compact in position. It is similar to the application of a cache mechanism in a CPU and Operation System. We believe it is possible to introduce this mechanism into an alert fusion.
We explored the existence of a pattern resembling cache in a realistic network environment. However, when the alerts were collected, the fusion process should have followed an alert fusion policy which was a set of matching rules. To deal with the problem of evading possibility, we designed a simple but more effective method: target-oriented policy. The alerts were mainly clustered as long as they satisfied the requirements of duplicated category and co-operating category (having same destination and attack type).
Our work contributes to improving the survivable status of the fusion system. This is mainly through the cache-based design for efficient promotion and reasonable fusion. Our work also contributes to simple target-oriented policy, which brings the assurance of a more suitable and reasonable output, especially in accordance with the state machine correlation because the whole system performs well in its inescapable nature. A further contribution of our work is a lightweight scheme for large-scale intrusion alert fusion. The structure of CAFS is a simple two-layer cascaded fusion in which the first layer fuses alerts of single IDS and the next layer mainly acts as a collector and relay. The cache-based and target-oriented mechanisms were applied in CAFS. With significant decreases in efficiency and complexity, we think this lightweight fusion engine is more suitable to be used on most occasions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 elaborates on the analysis of alerts, which is the basis of this paper. Section 4 presents CAFS, which is simple, efficient and scalable in most applications. Section 5 reports on our experiments, and Section 6 concludes this paper and points to future research directions.
II. TYPE STYLE AND FONTS
The process of EMERALD [9] implemented a 'probabilistic' alert fusion engine. Instead of using a large, crisp time-window, in another paper [10] , the same authors advocated the use of fuzzy intervals. Thomas and Balakrishnan [11] addressed the trade-off between the detection rate and false alerts. They found the performance of the detector was better when the fusion threshold was determined according to the Chebyshev inequality. Readers can find similar research on the application of probabilistic methods in [12] and [13] .
Another representative method is the slicing of alerts into several categories. Oliver Dain [14] assigned each of these alerts to one of five categories: discovery, scan, escalation, DoS, and stealth. Herve Debar [4] arranged intrusion alerts to be aggregated into seven situations. Zhichun Li [15] constructed the decrease key on the basis of DoS attack, port scan, virus, worms and botnets. Our work differs to these researchers in the idea of organized categories. The targetoriented policy has the rationality in a semantic description of targets' state switch.
The signal processing method was used in alert fusion as demonstrated by Viinikka [16] . The approach detailed in [3] constructed alert time series by counting the number of events occurring in fixed-size sampling intervals. K. Julisch [17, 18] reported that 99% of the alerts produced by IDSs could be false positives. Devi Parikh [19] proposed a pattern recognition approach to minimize the cost of errors but did not consider reducing the error rate itself.
Furthermore, there are other fusion methods that used special frameworks. The fusion method of P2P was used by Indra [20] who utilized Pastry and Scribe while Domino [21] utilized Chord. Centralized architecture was used in DIDS [22] , EMERALD [9] and SOCBox [20] with alerts collected directly from IDSs.
A distributed framework method was used by Min Cai [23] who introduced a DHT-based overlay network to defend against flooding. Zhichun Li [15] used the same method as Cai, but Li embeded the intrusion symptoms into the DHT dimensions so that alerts related to the same intrusion could be routed to the same sensor fusion center with a good load balance. LarSID [24] defended against attacks by sharing potential evidence of intrusions between participant IDSs via DHT. The work of Ming Xu [25] was similar to the work of Zhichun Li, but he differed in the details of the route mechanism in his approach.
III. ALERTS ANALYSIS

A. Cache-based Mechanism in Datasets
In the analysis of our experiments, we installed the Snort (version: 2.8.0.2; rules: snortrules-snapshot-2.8) on the computer and used the 'replay' operation to analyze the classic datasets. All the records were replayed through the Snort, and as a result, the alerts of datasets were stored in the "c:\ids\snort\log\alert" file. In further analysis, we adopted the regular expression to divert each part of one alert, and processed the content in the memory. Put simply, the alerts were combined if they had the same equivalent sources, targets and alert types. This was the most basic policy for fusion. The goal was to test the spatial and temporal properties of the alerts. We kept a sliding window to organize the fusion process. Below are the three definitions for the analysis:
Suppose there are two alerts: alert A and alert B. When alert fusion is processed linearly, fusion range is defined as the number of alerts between A and B.
Definition 2 (Fusion Quota)
Suppose there are only X and Y alerts left after the fusion process. We also suppose R as the number of alerts fused in range N. The fusion quota in Figure 1 is defined as (1). Its denominator denotes the total number of alerts which have been fused. Table I uses (2). This indicates how many alerts the fusion in range N has fused.
We calculated the fusion quota from range 1 to range 10. According to each dataset, the results were presented as Bars respectively. The values in Figure 2 indicate two facts: a) the fusion quota occupies the total alert fusion to a share of more than 90% in range 10; b) we can define a watershed in range 5, because after that point, the ascending curves of the fusion quota slope gently. Figure 1 clearly depicts the tendency of fusion proportions, in correspondence of which Table 1 exhibits the statistics of this fusion process. In "FP-10", almost all alert fusion proportions reach a value of more than 80%. These values approach the values in "MFP". Note that the MIT DARPA 1999 dataset is an exception, as its fusion extent reaches just 73% in range 5 and 78% in range 10. However, the tendency resembles the others. It could also reflect the similar nature of alerts as well.
These interesting natures remind us of the cache mechanism in CPU and storing management in operation systems. Scientists have proven that commands can be invoked in the nearby storing space, in order to introduce the cache, which has a higher read/write speed, into the CPU. The cache stores the nearby commands and applies the LRU (Least Recently Used) algorithm for refreshing the data. According to the above discussion, we think the cache mechanism can also be applied into intrusion alert fusion. One of our intentions in our experiment was to build a survivable system. We believe the promotion of fusion efficiency can be beneficial when too many alerts arrive suddenly. When related to the cache-based mechanism, the alerts will primarily search for fusion within the cache range rather than the whole alerts storage, therefore becoming more feasible for alert fusion.
B. Analysis in Campus Network
The In our experience, IDSs are generally deployed inside the network, using a by-pass tunnel right behind the firewall. The firewall is configured to drop 'ping' packets. However, we opened the detection of 'ping' packets within the IDS to monitor those which shouldn't have appeared inside the network. During the investigation, we built such an environment in our campus network and adopted the 'ping' packets to bomb the network from inside (we estimated the attacker found a method to neglect the firewall). We used the tool of "IP-Traffic" [26] to create 'ping' packets. TCP/IP sent out 'ping' packets using best-of-effort mechanism. We recorded the duration of alert emission of Snort. The whole experiment contained eight procedures with different quantities of packets and durations. The alert emission speed was calculated by the duration divided the quantity of alerts. Table II comprises the results of this analysis. We can see the alert emission speed reached more than 100 pieces per second. The rule of Snort for the detection of 'ping' was in "snort/rules/icmp-info". Suppose in a large-scale environment, an attacker launched 'ping' and flooded the whole network where several IDSs existed. The fusion center then received strengthened alerts flooding, and as a result the rendezvous point was easily overwhelmed if no counter-solution was adopted. In this situation, cachebased mechanism ran pretty well because only a few alerts was produced by perceiving the repeated ones.
C. Cache-based Mechanism in Australian Honey-pot
We further investigated the alerts from the Australian honey-Pot where Snort was deployed. The rules used were from "Oinkmaster" [27] . These rules were a collection of free rules that we could get from the Snort community. Firstly, we fused the alerts by the same policy used in our previous analysis. The alerts were combined if they had the same equivalent sources, targets and alert types. Subplot A of Figure 2 shows the results. Unfortunately, only 22.69% of the alerts could be clustered within range 10. The reason for this was that the Australian Honey-Pot was designed to suffer mostly from DoS attacks. The attackers frequently changed the source IP addresses and ports of the packets, and as a result, the alerts emitted by Snort contained different sources. When we adopted the more reasonable target-oriented policy for the fusion analysis, the results improved a lot, which was depicted in subplot B of Figure  2 . In fact, we were able to gain a better fusion result after a little calibration on the "Oinkmaster" rules.
We also checked its emission speed of alerts which were counted for each hour during a 6-month period (one hour interval was the same with [3] ). As we can see in the subplot C of Figure 2 , on most occasions, alert emissions were sparse except one situation of value 240. The related alert is : This alert came up when certain web applications occur, but in general it was just a warning for us to check the system to see if anything had compromised it. The rule itself could be "#" out as lots of security experts do; but for us in the Australian Honey-Pot, we set it. In the experiment, this alert was produced at six to ten pieces per second. The result was not good enough to prove the worth of using cache-based mechanisms, but it showed the promise of using this utility when deployed in reality.
D. Target-oriented Policy
As we described before, the aim of our project was to build an inescapable system. To achieve this, we adopted a state machine to correlate the alerts into scenarios. The best aspect of this design was the real-time descriptions for the status of victims, which led to the attackers hardly avoiding correlation by stealthy attack (i.e. multi-step attack). No matter when the attackers launch the next stage of an attack, the state machine records the current status of victims.
This correlation method however, needs the accurate expression of a current attack. Unfortunately, during the analysis process, we found the current fusion was ambiguous. For example, many alerts could be clustered as scan category due to the same source. Meanwhile, some of them could also be fused with other alerts for a DoS attack because they have the same destination. Besides, sophisticated attackers often adopt an IP-Spoof to avoid detection. Stealthy attacks like botnet can conceal their real sources, making the source properties of alerts not reliable at all. Moreover, current fusion policies simply fuse alerts in fixed durations. This durations resembling expert knowledge have an inherent drawback that they are not stable and different conditions decide different values. Even in the same scenario, the duration varies from the beginning to the end, let alone in slow attack. As we can see in subplot A of Figure  2 , general policy cannot fuse the alerts efficiently. The reason was that attackers continuously switched their source IP when they launched the attack, so that alerts from HoneyPot had different sources and could not be fused together.
To facilitate the alerts analysis, we simplified the IDMEF [28] (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format) to a structure in Figure 3 and classified fusion cases into 4 categories: Duplicated Category, Scan Category, Cooperating Category and Sequence Category. The ambiguity exists in the scan category and co-operating category. We detail the ambiguity in a scenario: The headquarters organizes several attackers to scan an adverse network for vulnerabilities. The alerts contain the same Alert Type and Source IP. They can be clustered by a scan category. Meanwhile, if the scan traffic is heavy, the attack could be considered a DoS attack. This could be clustered by a cooperating category because some alerts have the same Alert Type and Dest IP.
To address these problems, we designed a target-oriented policy, where alerts were fused when duplicated or the cooperating category was satisfied, which meant Alert Type and Dest IP and Port were same. This method could seamlessly collaborate with the next correlation phase. The aim of the correlation analysis is to identify multi-step attacks which present a series of actions. The alerts of each step denote the current state of the victim. To comply with the requirement of correlation, the alert fusion should be circumfused with targets. Furthermore, the source information could be concealed, forged, changed, or unknown, while the victim information cannot. When victims suffer intensive attack like DoS, the target-oriented policy helps the fusion to be more efficient. As indicated in subplot B of Figure 2 , the efficiency greatly improved when we clustered the alerts of the Honey-Pot by target-oriented policy. We believe the fusion rate be better when the policy was deployed in other real environments.
IV. ALERT FUSION ARCHITECTURE
According to the analysis above, we proposed CAFS: a novel cache-based alerts fusion scheme. It is simple but very effective to be deployed in most occasions. We also applied target-oriented mechanism as the alerts fusion policy. As is depicted in Figure 4 , this scheme is composed of three levels: IDSs, preprocessing component and fusion server.
The first level is composed of IDSs. It produces hundreds of thousands of alerts. As is declared in section II-B, the fusion quota occupies the total alerts fusion to a share of more than 90% in range 10. Therefore, for the release of overhead in the fusion server, we installed one preprocessing component of fusion after each IDS. The intention of this had two aspects: standardizing the alerts format and decreasing the useless alerts quantity. With cache-based mechanism and target-oriented policy applied, the alerts from IDSs were pre-fused by the preprocessing component. Actually, this is easy to be implemented in snort. Snort could configure the customized output component in the "snort.conf" file.
We implemented the CAFS linearly. Look at Figure 4 , when an alert is received from IDS, it will be inputted to the Fusion Waiting Queue. Then, this alert compares the first alert of Fusion Queue. If the comparison satisfies the duplicated or cooperating category, they are fused under the target-oriented policy. If the comparison doesn't satisfy the categories, the alert searches match of alerts one by one until the fusion range reaches. Similar to the LRU algorithm in operation systems, because this alert has an 80% probability to be fused in the next round, this fused alert will be moved to the front of the Fusion Queue. We define this as LMHP (Latest Matching Highest Priority) algorithm.
V. EXPERIMENT
A. For Survivability
We have implemented all the techniques we discussed in this paper. In our implementation, we used C++ as the programming language, and Microsoft SQL Server 2000 as the database to store the fused alerts.
In CAFS, the alerts emitted from IDSs will be sent firstly to preprocessing component for pre-fusing. The output is then processed together in the fusion server for comprehensive fusion. At last, the fused alerts are stored in database, waiting for correlation analysis and responses. In another side, traditional centralized architecture delivers the alerts to the fusion server directly, which dramatically aggravates the overhead of centralized server. For survivability test, we proved its validity through the comparison of fusion durations between CAFS and traditional centralized scheme. If the duration was shorter than traditional centralized scheme, it proved CAFS was more efficient and survivable.
The fusion durations were recorded in the Table III by seconds. We found CAFS were better in an extent of 10% more or less. Even when the quantities of alerts became more, the decrease percentages of fusion durations became larger. We believed this was because the fusion server had an initializing process time, which had been included in the whole value.
B. For Inescapability
The second test we performed validated the correctness of the target-oriented policy. We investigated the original alerts of the Australian Honey-Pot and further checked each alert after fusion. The quantity of alerts was 4,787 and after fusion the quantity of alerts rose to 3,287 when the fusion range was set to 10. During our observations, we found the result of fusion was reasonable except on one occasion. The automatic attack tools have the ability to switch the source
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The alerts are fused if either duplicated or cooperated relation is satisfied. Fig. 4 . Scheme of Alerts Fusion.
ports and change the speed of packet emission. The Snort in the honey-pot emitted a lot of alerts have different source ports. We calibrated our design and avoided the appearance of such cases. Table IV shows the results after calibration. The fusion rate reached more than 90% after range 2, which is in concert with the classical datasets. This proves the value of cached-based mechanism from another point of view.
C. For Deployment
We calculated the maximum number of IDSs for deployment. Take our PCs for example; we recorded the fusion durations and the quantities of alerts. The speed for alert fusion was then evaluated to be more or less 40,000 pieces/second. We introduced 103 pieces/second as a round evaluation. This meant the PC could endure alerts emitted from 400 IDSs in traditional centralized architecture. With cache mechanism applied, it could process ten times more, which was 4000 IDSs. We declared that the evaluation was based on experiential computation, which did not take other parameters into consideration.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented several interesting designs in our project of alert fusion and correlation. Our aim was to implement a survivable, inescapable and deployable system. With the introduction of a cached-based mechanism and target-oriented fusion policy, our system attained significant improvements to achieve our original intention. 
